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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements eviscerate the Seventh Amendment 
right to trial by jury and the rule of law; however, this contractual waiver of judicial 
process is expressly authorized by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2  Over the past 
few decades the Supreme Court has stretched the contractual approach in application 
of the FAA so that “mandatory arbitration clauses have become not merely favorites, 
but darlings of the courts.”3  While it can be argued that little basis in contract law 
exists to exempt mandatory pre-dispute agreements from general contract principles, 
special contract rules peculiar to arbitration have developed concurrently over this 
period of time. 
General contract construction principles indicate that the party seeking to prove 
the agreement bears the burden of proof.  However, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly noted “that the party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that 
the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration.”4  Further, the Court recently 
expressly construed an ambiguous agreement in favor of arbitration by holding “we 
should not, on the basis of ‘mere speculation’ [determine in advance] that an 
arbitrator might interpret these ambiguous agreements in a manner that casts their 
                                                                
1 Advocacy Program Director and Visiting Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law, 
Camden, New Jersey. 
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994). 
3 Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 776 (2002). 
4 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (referring to its 
“prior holdings” on the burden of proof with regard to this rule of construction and holding 
that the party resisting arbitration on grounds that it would be too expensive likewise “bears 
the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs”). 
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enforceability into doubt . . . .”5  These contract construction principles favoring 
arbitration are doctrines unique to arbitration contract law and were cited last year by 
a federal appellate court in affirming a motion to compel arbitration for race 
discrimination claims.6 
The arbitration contract award is likewise treated differently on appeal.  Unlike 
lower court awards, which can be successfully appealed for either errors of law or 
significant misinterpretation of the facts, arbitral decisions are subject to a more 
limited review and typically can be vacated on far more limited grounds.7  
Arbitrators can and do enter awards that do not reflect application of the rule of 
common law or even statutory law.  The low rate of challenges to arbitral decisions 
is due in part to the fact that once an arbitrator has issued an award it is quite difficult 
to vacate.8  
If the true purpose of Section 2 of the FAA is “to make arbitration agreements as 
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so,”9 an argument can be made that, 
when arbitration clauses are involved, federal courts have in effect gone beyond 
promoting neutrality in contracting and have created a special class of “super 
enforceable” contracts.  These “super enforceable” arbitration agreements get the 
“but more so” treatment as a result of the Supreme Court’s repeated interpretation of 
the FAA in a manner to counter the judiciary’s historical mistrust of arbitration.10  
This article first explores the Supreme Court’s initially reluctant application of 
the FAA’s contract approach to enforceability of arbitration agreements which lasted 
well into the early 1980s.  It, then, examines federal preemption of state law and the 
evolution of the arbitration contract as we know it today.  Finally, it looks at the 
application of defenses that exist “at law or in equity for the revocation of contracts ” 
as applied over the past ten years following the Court’s decision in Doctor’s Assocs., 
Inc. v. Casarotto.  This author examines a decade of decisional law and finds a new 
doctrine of arbitration jurisprudence developing under the FAA that is sensitive to 
the unique concerns raised by adhesion arbitration agreements.  Whether the courts 
are inappropriately stretching the unconscionability defense is matter of 
speculation.11 
                                                                
5 Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406-07 (2003) (compelling 
arbitration of a RICO claim and permitting the arbitrator to decide in the first instance whether 
the agreement barring “punitive damages” also barred the treble damages allowed under the 
RICO statute). 
6 See Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
7 See generally Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (stating in dictum, “the 
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to the manifest disregard are not 
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error . . .”). 
8 See generally Pierre Lalive, Enforcing Awards, in 60 YEARS OF ICC ARBITRATION: A 
LOOK AT THE FUTURE 317, 319 (1984). 
9 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967). 
10 See Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995). 
11 STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND 
OTHER PROCESSES 265 (4th ed. 2003) (“Judicial receptivity to unconscionability arguments 
suggests that courts, at least in the arbitration area, may be stretching the unconscionability 
definition in order to invalidate arbitration agreements.”). 
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II.  ARBITRATION HOSTILITY 
Arbitration is probably as old as human society.12  As early as the thirteenth 
century, merchants in England were resolving their disputes outside the common 
law.13  In the early days of the Republic merchants in England and America 
voluntarily submitted matters of trade to arbitration, preferring this dispute resolution 
process over the common law courts.  This preference continued well into the 
nineteenth century.14  Despite its historical legitimacy as a private process for dispute 
resolution, early English judicial decisions demonstrate reluctance to enforce private 
agreements.  The earliest judicial hostility15 reflected a concern for the defense of 
judges’ turf.  This concern was first articulated in a 1746 decision by a King’s Bench 
court in a ruling proclaiming that such agreements wrongly “oust” properly 
constituted courts of their jurisdiction.16  Commentators have advanced two primary 
reasons for this “ouster doctrine.”  The first suggested a concern for the lack of 
procedural safeguards that could potentially result in a miscarriage of justice.  The 
second, more cynical theory, opined judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration 
agreements on greed, arguing that private arbitration was seen as an economic threat 
to English judges, whose incomes often depended on the fees from disputants.  In 
England, Parliament responded to commercial interests as early as 1684 by enacting 
an arbitration statute authorizing judicial enforcement of properly executed 
arbitration agreements.  The ouster doctrine traveled across the Atlantic and 
remained the common law rule in the United States until the early twentieth 
                                                                
12 See generally Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the 
United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 242-43 (1928) (reporting that arbitration was practiced 
in Athens and Rome).  
13 See JULIUS H. COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 2 (1918) (quoting then-
Senator Elihu Root’s address to the American Bar Association in 1914); Soia Mentschikoff, 
Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-55 (1961). 
14 See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-
1860 (1977). 
15 In this article the phrase “hostility” refers to enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.  
Judicial doctrine was generally not “hostile” to enforcing completed arbitration awards.  See 
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1942); see also 
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION-NATIONALIZATION-
INTERNALIZATION 20 (1992) (reporting that prior to an arbitration award, one party could 
unilaterally revoke the arbitrator’s authority, even after the arbitration hearing); Thomas E. 
Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 40 ME. L. REV. 263, 267 
(1988) (noting that at one time courts in the United States would not enforce an agreement to 
arbitrate until the arbitrator had issued the award).  
16 Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746). 
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century.17  Judges adopted that hostility with little examination.18  Most American 
courts deemed such agreements to arbitrate as revocable at the will of either party.19 
In America, purely executory agreements to arbitrate had little contractual force.  
Parties could refuse to honor such agreements and could revoke them at any time.  
The doctrine of specific performance did not apply to agreements to arbitrate 
existing or future disputes.  Common law courts did not recognize arbitration 
agreements as grounds to bar common law actions.20  In theory, damages could be 
sought for breach of contract, but judicial hostility prevailed and only nominal 
damages were recognized.21 
Despite American courts’ refusal to apply contract law to enforce arbitration 
agreements, many parties submitted disputes to arbitration on a voluntary basis.  
Arbitration satisfied a need for expert, speedy, informal and inexpensive resolution 
of disputes while litigation did not.  Merchants of many trade types preferred 
arbitration over common law suits, however enforcement of the agreement to 
arbitrate depended on mutual assent.(add a fotenote)  If a trade member wanted to 
ignore the agreement, as Tobey v. County of Bristol reveals, the party seeking 
enforcement would get no help from the courts.  General contract law was 
inapplicable.  In the 1920s, business and commercial entities (frustrated by the 
court’s unwillingness to order specific performance of agreements to arbitrate) 
joined to lobby for legislative change.22  It was around this time that legislatures 
began to enact laws specifically aimed at the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 
III. THE FAA: BEYOND NEUTRALITY - EVOLUTION OF THE “SUPER 
ENFORCEABLE” ARBITRATION CONTRACT 
The FAA was passed in 1925 to counter this judicial mistrust of arbitration.23  
Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act (USAA) (now called the Federal 
Arbitration Act or FAA).24  The original assumption was that the FAA applied only 
                                                                
17 See CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE 
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 481 (2005). 
18 See LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 31 (2000) (“Traditionally, courts 
have been hostile to arbitration, viewing it as an institution that would deprive the courts of 
their jurisdiction.”). 
19 See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co., 126 F.2d at 979 (providing an opinion summarizing 
the common law); see also United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 
222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915). 
20 See Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313 (1845); Kulukundis Shipping Co., 
126 F.2d at 983.   
21 See Munson v. Straits of Dover S.S Co., 102 F. 926, 928 (2d Cir. 1900) (awarding only 
nominal damages for a breach of agreement to arbitrate reasoning that judicial process is  
“theoretically at least, the safest and best devised by the wisdom and experience of mankind”). 
22 See generally Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 
12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926) (summarizing the business interests at the time behind the 
movement for early statutory reform). 
23 See Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos., 513 U.S. at 270. 
24 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1999). 
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in federal courts.25  If this assumption proved true, states would remain free to refuse 
contractual enforcement of agreements to arbitrate by legislation or interpretation of 
state common law.  Application of the FAA in state courts was seen as a threat to the 
many state common and statutory laws hostile to arbitration.  This view was 
grounded in the fact that the FAA had been broadly interpreted to apply to any 
“contract evidencing a transaction in commerce.”26  
We begin by reviewing the somewhat innocuous language of Section 2 of the 
FAA which provides: 
A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any 
part thereof, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.27 
The passage of the act did not immediately translate into judicial acceptance or 
adoption of the mandate that arbitration contracts were to be enforced “save upon 
such grounds that exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.”28  
Following the enactment of the FAA the Supreme Court and lower courts remained 
somewhat suspicious (if not hostile) to arbitration.  Courts failed to uniformly 
embrace the mandate of Section 2 that arbitration contracts were to be “enforceable” 
and treated like “any contract” and often hesitated to grant motions to compel 
arbitration in circumstances they felt were inappropriate.  
It would take several decades for the Supreme Court to embrace arbitration and 
to fully support a contractual approach in matters involving arbitration.  In 1983, the 
Court in Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. reaffirmed the 
contractual approach in a case involving an arbitration clause in a construction 
contract.29  The Court also went a step beyond encouraging mere neutrality by 
creating a presumption in favor of arbitration,30 Justice Brennan opined for the 
majority: 
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for 
the federal policy favoring arbitration . . .  The Arbitration Act establishes 
that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the 
                                                                
25 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §§ 10.2, 10.3.1, 10.3.2 (1995). 
26 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); See generally Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos., 513 U.S. at 269-70 
(demonstrating that the scope of the FAA’s coverage has been broadly interpreted to 
correspond with Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (interpreting FAA’s § 1 exclusion to apply only to transportation 
workers, thereby limiting the role states could play in regulating arbitration). 
27 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
28 Id. 
29 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
30 Id. at 24-25. 
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problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an 
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.31 
It is significant to note that although Justice Brennan in the majority opinion 
referenced this policy “favoring” arbitration as if it were a longstanding judicial 
philosophy, the policy is nowhere to be found in previous Court decisions;32 
however, post-Cone it was cited as settled law.33  Despite this articulated 
presumption, the contract approach was not uniformly applied in all cases involving 
arbitration clauses.  However, by 1984 the Court reiterated its policy favoring 
arbitration and struck a final blow to the lack of enforcement of arbitration contracts 
by the states.  In Southland Corp. v. Keating,34 the Court took on the issue of whether 
a state could refuse to enforce an agreement to arbitrate between a franchisor and 
franchise notwithstanding a state law invalidating such agreements.  The Court held 
that the FAA created a federal body of substantive law as part of its “national 
policy”35 favoring arbitration. 
For decades, special defenses were utilized by courts refusing to compel 
arbitration of statutory claims.  In Wilko v. Swan,36 a buyer of securities sued a seller 
for fraud under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.  The Supreme Court 
refused to compel arbitration despite the arbitration clause in the sales contract, 
holding instead that the clause was void as an invalid waiver of the substantive law 
created by the securities statute.  Lower courts subsequently applied this special 
“public policy” defense to enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA 
when statutory claims were at issue.37   
Three decades later, between 1985 and 1989,  the Court in the Mitsubishi 
Trilogy,  approved compulsory arbitration in statutory claims involving securities, 
antitrust and racketeering; they explicitly overruled Wilko:38 “[W]e are well past the 
time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence 
of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means 
of dispute resolution.”39  The Mitsubishi Court, in an attempt to put an end to any 
lingering “judicial suspicion” of arbitration, again interpreted the FAA as creating a 
                                                                
31 Id. 
32 See generally Jean Sternlight, Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference For Binding 
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 660-61 (1996) (characterizing this enunciated philosophy 
as a “myth” swayed or at least influenced by a desire to conserve judicial resources). 
33 See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.  
34 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1984). 
35 Id. at 10-11. 
36 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
37 See, e.g., A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 716 (9th Cir. 1968); 
Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968). 
38 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479-80, 486 
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987); Mitsubishi, 
473 U.S. at 616, 640. 
39 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27. 
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presumption of arbitrability with regard to whether arbitration is permitted under a 
particular statutory claim.40   
The 1991 landmark decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.41 
illustrates just how far the Court had come since its refusal to apply the FAA to 
contracts involving the Securities Act in Wilko.  In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held 
that in the employment context, it would enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement 
signed by a non-union employee as a condition of employment when a federal 
statutory employment claim was at issue.42   Although the holding in Gilmer 
expressly applied only to claims brought under the federal Age Discrimination and 
Employment Act (ADEA), “the lower federal courts have compelled arbitration of 
claims arising under virtually all federal employment statues, state employment 
statutes, and state common law doctrines.”43  This 1991 decision “precipitated a 
veritable stampede by employers to fashion agreements with their employees to 
submit employment disputes to binding arbitration.”44  This “stampede” has 
continued in the employment field and has expanded into all areas of consumer 
law.45 
In summary, it can be argued that the current arbitration contract construction 
policy is the child of the federal judiciary’s relentless efforts to counteract historical 
hostility to arbitration.  Although the gestation of this policy took decades, by the 
mid-1990s Justice Trieweiler of the Montana Supreme Court, in upholding a state 
law which conditioned enforceability of arbitration clauses on compliance with a 
“first page” notice requirement, spoke for many state court judges when he wrote in 
a specially concurring opinion that the federal judiciary “perverted the purpose of the 
FAA from one to accomplish judicial neutrality, to one of open hostility to any 
legislative effort[s]” designed to promote contractual fairness when arbitration 
clauses were involved.46  In 1996, the Supreme Court invalidated this Montana 
notice statute in Casarotto;47 however, Justice Trieweiler’s opinion published in 
1994 reflects the tension between state and federal judges on this issue at that time: 
To those federal judges who consider forced arbitration as the panacea for 
their “heavy case loads” and who consider the reluctance of state courts to 
buy into the arbitration program as a sign of intellectual inadequacy, I 
would like to explain a few things . . . In Montana, we are reasonably 
civilized and have a sophisticated system of justice which has evolved 
                                                                
40 Id. (holding that the statutory claim will be presumed arbitrable absent explicit evidence 
that Congress intended to preclude arbitration under the statue in question).  
41 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
42 Id. at 35.   
43 COOPER ET AL., supra note 18, at 557. 
44 William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really 
Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 255 (1994). 
45 See infra Part IV. 
46 Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 941 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially 
concurring), rev’d, Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
47 Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688-89. 
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over time and which we continue to develop for the primary purpose of 
assuring fairness to those people who are subject to its authority . . .What I 
would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially at the appellate 
level, to understand is that due to their misinterpretation of congressional 
intent when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their naive 
assumption that arbitration provisions and choice of law provisions are 
knowingly bargained for, all of these procedural safeguards and 
substantive laws are easily avoided by any party with enough leverage to 
stick a choice of law and an arbitration provision in its pre-printed 
contract and require the party with inferior bargaining power to sign it . . . 
[I]f the Federal Arbitration Act is to be interpreted as broadly as some of 
the decisions from our federal courts would suggest, then it presents a 
serious issue regarding separation of powers.  What these interpretations 
do, in effect, is permit a few major corporations to draft contracts 
regarding their relationship with others that immunizes them from 
accountability under the laws of the states where they do business, and by 
the courts in those states . . . These insidious erosions of state authority 
and the judicial process threaten to undermine the rule of law as we know 
it . . . Nothing in our jurisprudence appears more intellectually detached 
from reality and arrogant that the lament of federal judges who see this 
system of imposed arbitration as “therapy for their crowded dockets.” 
These decisions have perverted the purpose of the FAA from one to 
accomplish judicial neutrality, to one of open hostility to any legislative 
effort to assure that unsophisticated parties to contracts of adhesion at 
least understand the rights they are giving up.48 
Other voices questioned the broad interpretation of the FAA;49 however, the 
Supreme Court continued down the path articulated by Justice Brennan in Cone50 
when Casarotto reached it in 1996. 
IV. DOCTOR’S ASSOCIATES, INC. V. CASAROTTO 
In Casarotto, the Supreme Court again enhanced enforceability of arbitration 
agreements when it held that the preemptive scope of the FAA applied to the 
Montana statute.  Montana law, at the time, declared “an arbitration clause 
unenforceable unless ‘[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration’ is ‘typed in 
                                                                
48 Casarotto, 886 P.2d at 939-41. 
49 See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos., 513 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I 
have long adhered to the view, discussed below, that Congress designed the Federal 
Arbitration Act to apply only in federal courts.”); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute 
Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 
(2001); Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or 
Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 331 (1996); Margaret  M. Harding, The 
Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a 
Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397 (1998); Johanna Harrington, To Litigate or 
Arbitrate? No Matter—The Credit Card Industry is Deciding for You, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 
101 (2001).  
50 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 1. 
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underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.’”51  The arbitration clause 
in Casarotto did not comply with the statute because it was on page nine and in 
ordinary type.  This case is a prime example of lower courts resisting the efforts of 
the Supreme Court to support binding arbitration in all areas of law.  The case 
history shows that the Montana Supreme Court twice voided the arbitration clause 
before the Supreme Court made a final ruling that the clause was invalid. 
Casarotto involved a Subway sandwich shop standard form franchise agreement 
requiring all claims relating to the agreement to be arbitrated by the American 
Arbitration Association in Connecticut.  When a dispute arose, the franchisees 
brought suit in a Montana state court, alleging state-law contract and tort claims.  
The franchisor sought to stop litigation pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration 
clause on page nine of the agreement and successfully moved to stay the state court 
litigation pending arbitration.  The Montana Supreme Court reversed the stay 
holding that the Montana Statute rendered the arbitration clause unenforceable.  The 
question for the Supreme Court was whether Montana’s law was compatible with the 
FAA or whether it conflicted and was therefore displaced or preempted by the 
federal statute.  The Supreme Court reversed the Montana court’s decision finding 
preemption “because the State’s law conditions the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to 
contracts generally.”52  However, the Court also affirmed its contract approach to 
arbitration agreements holding: 
Section 2 of the FAA provides that written arbitration agreements “shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for revocation of any contract.”  9 U. S. C. § 2 . . . 
(citations omitted) . . . the text of § 2 declares that state law may be 
applied “if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, 
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” (citation omitted) . 
. . Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements 
without contravening § 2. (citations omitted).53 
Thus, while it can be argued that state regulatory power to protect consumers from 
unintentionally waiving access to the courts was severely curtailed in Casarotto54 
and that the number of standard form arbitration agreements would grow,55 this 
                                                                
51 Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)). 
52 See id. at 687. 
53 Id. at 686-87. 
54 David Ling, Preserving Fairness in Arbitration Agreements: States’ Options after 
Casarotto, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 193, 205 (1997) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Casarotto, then, does have a largely eviscerating effect on state attempts to regulate arbitration, 
even those that are geared towards leveling the playing field between individuals with 
relatively little bargaining power and larger, more powerful corporations, employers, and 
franchisers.”). 
55 See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. 
v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1001, note 3 (1996) (referencing growth of 
standard form arbitration agreements signed by consumers, employees, and others). 
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article looks at how courts have applied the “generally applicable” contract defense 
of unconscionability in the wake of Casarotto. 
The FAA “preclude[s] States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect 
status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same footing as 
other contracts.’”56  In the wake of Casarotto, state courts were on notice that even 
seemingly benign regulatory laws would not be tolerated unless the laws applied to 
all contracts.  Commentators pronounced the demise of state regulatory action aimed 
at protecting citizens from unfair adhesion clauses compelling arbitration.57  
Concurrently, employers as well as retail sellers of goods continued their 
“stampede”58 in fashioning pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements drafted to 
cover every imaginable cause of action arising out of employment or arising under 
consumer law.  Many courts have replied by resurrecting the equitable doctrine of 
unconscionability in response to the proliferation of aggressively drafted standard 
form pre-dispute arbitration clauses.  This article looks at this judicial response.  
Perhaps, the strong endorsement of the contract approach to arbitration law in 
Casarotto is at least partly responsible for “unconscionability found” in state and 
federal decisional law in the decade immediately following the Supreme Court’s 
decision. 
V. UNCONSCIONABILITY FOUND UNDER STATE LAW 
While Casarotto on one hand may have significantly reduced states’ power to 
regulate arbitration through legislation, it also stands expressly for the proposition 
that an arbitration provision may be struck down if it is unconscionable.59  “Because 
unconscionability is a defense to contracts generally and does not single out 
arbitration agreements for special scrutiny, it is also a valid reason not to enforce an 
arbitration agreement under the FAA.”60  Upon a finding of unconscionability, state 
                                                                
56 Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 
(1974)). 
57 Ling, supra note 54, at 193-94 (“The [Casarotto] [c]ourt’s ruling likely will eviscerate 
existing state legislation aimed at establishing a minimum threshold of fairness in both the 
formation and the performance of arbitration agreements . . . .”); see also Henry C. Strickland, 
The Federal Arbitration Act’s Interstate Commerce Requirement: What’s Left for State 
Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385 (1992). Charles Knapp states: 
The United States Supreme Court, followed loyally, and for the most part 
enthusiastically, by the lower federal courts, has made the strong preference for 
enforcement of arbitration clauses a matter of federal preemption, so broadly and 
firmly expressed as to make it nearly impossible for even those state judges or state 
legislatures who might be so moved to exercise any restraining influence at all.  
Knapp, supra note 3, at 776-77. 
58 Howard, supra note 44, at 255. 
59 See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681; see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky 
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997). 
60 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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courts often have discretion to deny motions to compel arbitration in whole or in 
part.61 
The doctrine of unconscionability post-Casarotto is central to assessing the 
validity of mandatory arbitration clauses when they are challenged under state 
contract law.  The topic of mandatory arbitration clauses was the subject of 
discussion in June of 2003 when one hundred and twenty judges representing 31 
states convened for the Roscoe Pound Institute for State Appellate Court Judges.62  
The increasing role that state courts play in policing arbitration agreements in the 
wake of the Supreme Court pro-arbitration decisions was discussed.  Judge 
Trieweiler, the appellate court judge twice reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Casarotto noted: 
[W]hat we do cling to in Montana are notions of fairness.  And we also 
cling to the notion that if those traditional forms of protection aren’t 
provided by the courts, they are simply not going to be provided.  And 
included in the traditional notions of fairness are access to the courts, the 
right to trial by jury, and the right to reasonable discovery, so that you can 
develop your factual record.  We consider the rules of evidence important 
to fairness.  We consider the right to appeal, so that one can be sure that 
the decision was based on the law and the facts, important to principles of 
fairness.  And we believe that public courts, where you don’t pay for the 
judge, are important to the enforcement of the principles of fairness. 
 We have also taken the Supreme Court at face value.  We have taken it 
to mean what it says when it always points out to us that those grounds 
that exist at law and equity for the revocation of any contract can be 
applied to binding, pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 
 So, recently in Kloss, we held, as we have always held, that all 
contracts of adhesion have to be scrutinized for fairness, and they have to 
be scrutinized for whether they measure up to the reasonable expectations 
of the parties who have the least bargaining power.  And even if they do, 
they have to be scrutinized as to whether they are unconscionable.  We set 
forth in Kloss what kinds of facts are essential in developing a record of 
unconscionability.  We also said, in the concurring opinion in Kloss, that 
we will consider whether there has been a valid waiver of the 
constitutional right---the fundamental right in Montana---to trial by jury. . 
                                                                
61 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 696-97 
(Cal. 2000) (stating that California law grants courts the discretion to sever an unconscionable 
provision or to refuse to enforce the contract in its entirety, and in exercising this discretion 
courts look to whether “the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality” or “the 
illegality is collateral to [its] main purpose”). 
62 See, e.g., POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF JUSTICE? MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION, REPORT OF THE 2003 FORUM FOR STATE APPELLATE COURT JUDGES, 155 (2006), 
[hereinafter POUND] The report of the 2003 forum for state appellate court judges reports that, 
“[o]ne standard of assessing the validity of contracts that judges discussed in detail was 
whether the terms of the contract were unconscionable.  Several suggested that was a standard 
used regularly to overturn mandatory arbitration clauses.”  Id. 
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. . I think the reason we are able to apply the jury trial waiver standards in 
Montana is because we have done it in other contexts.63 
 
Other generally applicable contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or failure to meet 
the reasonable expectations of the parties also come into play as part of the 
unconscionability analysis.64  This article explores how contractual defenses are 
applied by courts refusing to enforce pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the last 
decade.  Courts have not found that arbitration clauses are unconscionable in general; 
such a finding would be plainly contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act; however, a 
new type of precedent under arbitration jurisprudence is emerging as a viable 
defense to arbitration contracts today.  “If nothing else, the arbitration wars have 
brought unconscionability back to center stage.”65 
State contract law is not expressly preempted by the FAA.66  In significant dicta, 
the Supreme Court in 1996 explained that “state law, whether of legislative or 
judicial origin, is applicable [to arbitration agreements] if that law arose to govern 
issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts 
generally.”67  However, “[o]rdinary principles of unconscionability may manifest 
themselves in forms peculiar to the arbitration context”68 and adhesion theory 
peculiar to arbitration and the FAA is developing.   
Most state courts will examine both procedural and substantive unconscionability 
when an arbitration clause is involved.69  Procedural unconscionability involves 
inquiry into the contract formation process.  This involves consideration of the nature 
of the negotiation process and the disclosure of arbitration terms focusing on 
concepts like “oppression” or “surprise” due to “unequal bargaining power.”70 
Substantive unconscionability involves an inquiry into the actual terms of the clause.  
                                                                
63 Id. at 37-38 (quoting Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002), cert. 
denied, 538 U.S. 956 (2003)).   
64 See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.  
65 See Knapp, supra note 3 at 797 n.120. 
66 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (providing that the arbitration agreement shall be “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract”). 
67 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (reiterating the preemption doctrine created 
in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), in holding that the FAA preempted 
California Labor Code § 229). 
68 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 693. 
69 See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that Pennsylvania law requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability to render a 
contract term unenforceable); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form 
Contracts and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1251-78 (2003) (concluding that 
most courts require both procedural and substantive unconscionability to exist before refusing 
to enforce an unambiguous contract provision). 
70  Armendariz, P.3d at 690 (quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 
473, 486-87 (1982)). 
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This involves consideration of the fairness evoked by the terms themselves.71  Courts 
focus on “overly harsh” or “one sided” results in finding substantive 
unconscionability.72  While most courts require a showing of both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability, the two factors are often treated as playing against one 
another in a sliding scale relationship.73  For example, the California Supreme Court 
has stated that “the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less 
evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that 
the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”74  In a number of other jurisdictions, a 
similar doctrine is set forth in slightly different terms.75  
The focus is on “fairness” and the defense of unconscionability will only succeed 
when circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the clause, the terms in the 
clause, or its contemplated implementation, render it particularly egregious.  While 
the doctrine of unconscionability is a standard contract defense and has been written 
about extensively elsewhere,76 factors unique to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses are evolving from decisions involving employment contracts and consumer 
contracts under the FAA.77  However, it may be helpful to briefly address the 
unconscionability analysis forming the basis for current law.   
The dictionary definition of “conscience” may be a good place to start. Most 
dictionaries define the word “conscience” in terms of morality and ethics.  A typical 
definition: “The awareness of a moral or ethical aspect to one’s conduct together 
with the urge to prefer right over wrong.”78  When we append the prefix “un”79 we 
come up with a “contrary” or “opposite” meaning or the urge to prefer “wrong over 
right.”  One definition of “unconscionability” is “[b]eyond prudence or reason.”80  
                                                                
71 See generally, Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (“Hereafter, to distinguish the two interests, I 
shall often refer to bargaining naughtiness as ‘procedural unconscionability,’ and to evils in 
the resulting contract as ‘substantive unconscionability.’”). 
72 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. 
73 See, e.g., Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs. Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 352 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1999) (discussing a “sliding scale” inquiry where a significant showing of either 
substantive or procedural unconscionability could render a provision unenforceable); W. 
DAVID S. LAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT 
LAW 142 (1996) (noting that a sliding scale is utilized by most courts). 
74 Armendariz, 6 P3d at 690. 
75 See, e.g., Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1170-72 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2004) (applying Ohio law, the court outlines a two prong test for determining 
unconscionability, explaining “procedural” and “substantive” unconscionability under contract 
law). 
76 See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
741, 771-73 (1982); M. P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L. J. 757, 
763-68 (1969). 
77 See infra notes 90-158 and accompanying text. 
78 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 391 (4th ed. 2000). 
79 Id. at 1869.  
80 Id. at 1873. 
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How do courts go about fashioning a legal standard for applying this elusive concept 
on a case-by-case basis? 
Common law courts traditionally left evaluation of the fairness of the bargain to 
the contracting parties.  Courts of Equity have historically refused to enforce 
agreements so unfair as to shock the conscience of the courts.81  The equitable 
doctrine of unconscionability applies to contracts generally82 and to contracts for the 
sale of goods specifically;83 however, “the definition of unconscionability remains 
sketchy and elusive.”84  How does a judge determine whether a particular agreement 
“shocks the conscience of the court?”  Irving Younger described the two-step 
analysis as an imprecise process which ultimately “add(s) up merely to the 
proposition that a judge’s conscience is his only guide.”85  This two-step analytical 
process was described early on as an inquiry into “procedural” and “substantive” 
unconscionability.86   
Procedural unconscionability or “bargaining naughtiness”87 traditionally involves 
the consideration of several factors including: (1) disparity of bargaining between the 
parties; (2) whether the parties had an opportunity to read and understand the terms; 
(3) whether the terms were in legalese or fine print; and (4) whether exploitation of a 
poor or uneducated party took place.88  Determining substantive unconscionability or 
the “evils in the resulting contract”89 involves weighing the disparity of exchange in 
light of the entire bargain as well as assessing the reasonableness of the individual 
terms.90  In light of the overall unconscionability analysis, adhesion contracts often 
receive scrutiny for fairness because by definition they involve a party with little 
bargaining power.  In this context, courts faced with boilerplate arbitration clauses 
involving individual employment or consumer contracts are crafting modern 
adhesion law under the FAA.91 
                                                                
81 See generally Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) (“That 
equity does not enforce unconscionable bargains is too well established to require citation.”). 
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). 
83 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998) (authorizing refusal to enforce “unconscionable” contracts in 
whole or part without specifically defining the term). 
84 Susan A. Fitzgibbon, Teaching Important Contracts Concepts: Teaching 
Unconscionability through Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Claims, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1401, 1405 (2000). 
85 Irving Younger, A Judge’s View of Unconscionability, 13 JUDGES’ J. 32, 33 (1974). 
86 See Leff, supra note 71. 
87 Id. 
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981). 
89 Leff, supra note 71, at 487. 
90 Id. 
91 See Korobkin, supra note 69 (“[A]rbitration jurisprudence is a good source of insight 
into the unconscionability doctrine.”). 
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While the judicially created unconscionability analysis generally begins with a 
determination of whether the clause at hand is one of adhesion,92 it does not end 
there.  The Supreme Court stated in fairly strong language in Gilmer that the “mere 
inequality in bargaining power” that often exists between employers and employees 
would not render an agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.93  Post Casarotto, courts 
began to apply general principles of contract law unconscionability with increasing 
frequency in the arbitration context.  California’s highest court led the way by 
reaffirming its view that “ordinary principles of unconscionability may manifest 
themselves in forms peculiar to the arbitration context” and further holding that 
“[o]ne such form is an agreement requiring arbitration for the claims of the weaker 
party but a choice of forum for the claims of the stronger party.”94  In Armendariz v. 
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., the court considered the defense of 
unconscionability as it applies “to any type of arbitration imposed on the employee 
by the employer as a condition of employment, regardless of the type of claim being 
arbitrated.”95  Armendariz involved two employees claiming wrongful termination 
based on sexual harassment and discrimination.  Both had signed pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in conjunction with application for employment forms.  The 
arbitration provisions mandated arbitration for employees who file claims against the 
employer, but the employer was free to sue in court.  The clauses signed expressly 
limited all “remedies for violation of the terms, conditions or covenants of 
employment . . . to a sum equal to the wages . . . earned from the date of any 
discharge until the date of the arbitration award.”96  Reinstatement and even 
injunctive relief were expressly excluded.97  The court applied the following 
unconscionability analysis to the facts of the case. 
Step number one in the analysis is to determine (under applicable state law) 
whether the contract is one of adhesion.  Armendariz, applied a sliding scale test 
examining the challenged arbitration provisions for both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.98  The phrase “contract of adhesion” is defined differently from 
state to state.  Under California law, “The term [contract of adhesion] signifies a 
standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior 
bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere 
to the contract or reject it.”99  In California, the court in Circuit City v. Adams, on 
remand from the Supreme Court, held that a finding that the arbitration clause is 
                                                                
92 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689 (“Unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into 
whether the contract is one of adhesion.”). 
93 Gilmer, 500 U. S. at 33. 
94 See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 693 (quoting its prior holding in Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).  
95 Id. at 689. 
96 Id. at 675. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 689-90. 
99 Id. at 689 (citing Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Reptr. 781, 784 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1961)). 
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within a contract of adhesion may be sufficient to render it procedurally 
unconscionable.100   
Step number two in the analysis is to “then determine whether ‘other factors are 
present which, under established legal rules – legislative or judicial – operate to 
render it [unenforceable].’”101  The court then went on to delineate two non-exclusive 
judicial limitations on the enforcement of adhesion contracts, one of which the court, 
by implication, indicates is peculiar to employment contracts: 
“Generally speaking, there are two judicially imposed limitations on the 
enforcement of adhesion contracts or provisions thereof.  The first is that 
such a contract or provision which does not fall within the expectations of 
the weaker party or ‘adhering’ party will not be enforced against him. The 
second – a principle of equity applicable to all contracts generally – is that 
a contract or provision, even if consistent with the reasonable expectations 
of the parties, will be denied enforcement if, considered in its context, it is 
unduly oppressive or ‘unconscionable.’” Subsequent cases have referred 
to both the “reasonable expectations” and the “oppressive” limitations as 
being aspects of unconscionability.102 
Thus, the unconscionability defense may be predicated upon a variety of factors and 
is a case sensitive analysis.103  “It’s so fact-patterned based on circumstances, which 
means that factors and the criteria shift every time you have a different set of 
circumstances.”104  The fact that traits specific to the very nature of the arbitration 
agreement itself come into play does not detract from the general unconscionability 
analysis mandated by Casarotto and followed by state courts today.105  A 
nonexclusive list would include: (1) a finding of an adhesive arbitration clause;106 (2) 
a finding of a term violating the “reasonable expectations” of the weaker bargaining 
party;107 or (3) a finding of “oppressive” limitations even when the “reasonable 
                                                                
100 See Adams, 279 F.3d at 893, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002) (revealing that the 
Ninth Circuit had the last word when finding the arbitration scheme unconscionable under 
standards of state law). 
101 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689 (citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 
1981)). 
102 Id. 
103 Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, No. A-44 September Term 2005, 2006 WL 2277984, at 
*4 (N.J. Aug. 9, 2006) (stating “The defense of unconscionability, specifically, calls for a fact-
sensitive analysis in each case, even when a contract of adhesion is involved.”). 
104 POUND supra note 62, at 115. 
105 But cf. Jeffery W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The 
Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 804, 809-10 (2004) (concluding that courts generally police 
arbitration agreements through a “paint by numbers” analysis citing traits specific to 
arbitration rather than by applying an “unconscionability norm”). 
106 Adams, 279 F.3d at 893. 
107 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689. 
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expectations” of the weaker bargaining party are satisfied.108  In Armendariz, the 
court held that the “unconscionable one-sidedness” of the agreement in the absence 
of justification rendered the arbitration clause unenforceable.109  
While the nature of the employee/employer relationship in a particular case plays 
a major factor in whether courts will compel arbitration, the defense has been 
successful in cases involving both low110 and high level employees.111  An arbitration 
agreement may also be found unconscionable even in the absence of a finding of a 
contract of adhesion.112   
This contractual defense of unconscionability is an extremely fertile ground for 
consumers as well as employees confronted by one-sided pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses.  A significant amount of important law relating to 
unconscionability is found in both the area of both employment and consumer law.  
In the ten year period since the Supreme Court in Casarotto struck the blow to state 
regulatory efforts to police fairness in the arbitration arena per se, many state courts 
have refused to enforce all or part of arbitration clauses on unconscionability 
grounds.113 
Increasingly, consumers encounter pre-dispute arbitration clauses in every day 
life.  Binding arbitration clauses are part of transactions involving sales of consumer 
goods,114 consumer services,115 credit card agreements,116 brokerage accounts,117 
                                                                
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 694. 
110 See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (declining to  
compel bartender to arbitrate Title VII claim on grounds that employer materially breached the 
agreement to arbitrate by promulgating egregiously one-sided and unfair arbitration rules); 
Garrett v. Hooters-Toledo, 295 F. Supp. 2d 774 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (refusing to compel waitress 
to arbitrate wrongful discharge upon a finding of procedural and substantive 
unconscionability); Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003) (declining 
to compel employee crane operators with limited education to arbitrate wrongful discharge 
claims upon finding of procedural unconscionability and substantively unconscionable time 
limitation for filing claim, limitations on relief, and excessive fee arrangements); Brennan v. 
Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding procedural 
unconscionability when employer used “high pressure tactics,” “gave the employees no more 
that fifteen minutes to review a sixteen-page single-spaced document,” and employee plaintiff 
“was an unrepresented, single mother who was then pregnant with twins, and lacked other 
adequate means of support”). 
111 Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (holding that an experienced executive employee is not 
estopped from claiming that contract’s arbitration clause was unconscionable). 
112 See Hooters, 173 F.3d at 938 (“The judicial inquiry, while highly circumscribed, is not 
focused only on an examination for contractual formation defects such as a lack of mutual 
consent and want of consideration.”). 
113 See infra notes 114-158 and accompanying text (discussing decisions invalidating 
arbitration provisions). 
114 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Brower v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
115 See, e.g., Winig v. Cingular Wireless L.L.C., No. C 06 4297 MMC., 2006 WL 2766007 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2006). 
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insurance policies,118 financial services,119 franchisor agreements,120 and even 
professional legal,121 accounting122 and health care services.123  In fact, “the 
possibilities for the use of arbitration in consumer contracts seem endless.”124  One 
study conducted in Los Angeles with respect to a hypothetical “Joe Average” 
revealed that approximately one-third of consumer transactions in his life were now 
covered by arbitration clauses.125  In most states, a finding of both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability is necessary for the defense to succeed.126  In just a few 
states, procedural unconscionability alone will render an arbitration clause 
unenforceable.127 However, such cases offer insight to the aggressive drafting and 
tactics utilized in the consumer field.  In one extreme case the court found procedural 
unconscionability when a surgical patient (dressed in surgical garb) on her way to 
surgery was asked to sign a standard form agreement without being told about the 
arbitration provision.128  The arbitration clause was buried in the form and provided 
for payment of all costs by the patient in the event she did not win less than one half 
the amount of the damages sought in arbitration.  In the event the doctor was found 
                                                           
116 See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
117 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 477. 
118 See, e.g., State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002). 
119 See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Ga. 
2003); Flores v. Transam. Homefirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); 
Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 1998). 
120 See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683; Inv. Partners, L.P., v. Glamour Shots Licensing, 
Inc., 298 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002); Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 
2001); We Care Hair Dev., Inc., v. Engen, 180 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 1999). 
121 See, e.g., Lau v. Antonio V. Silva, P.C., No. Civ. S-04-2351 WBS PAN (GGH) PS., 
2006 WL 2382266 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2006); Aguilar v. Lerner, 88 P.3d 24 (Cal. 2004). 
122 See, e.g., McNulty v. H&R Block, Inc., 843 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 2004). 
123 See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997); Sosa v. 
Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996); Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, 840 P.2d 1013 
(Ariz. 1992). 
124 ALLAN S. RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 643 
(3d ed. 2002). 
125 See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 55, 62 (2004). 
126 See Korobkin, supra note 69, at 1251-78. 
127 See, e.g., Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 431-32 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(applying Mississippi law to strike clause due to procedural unconscionability); Wilcox v. 
Valero Ref. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (applying Texas law to strike 
clause due to procedural unconscionability). 
128 See Sosa, 924 P.2d at 358. 
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not to have committed malpractice the patient was required to pay the defendant 
doctor $150 per hour for any time spent on the case, plus costs and attorney fees.129 
In the consumer arena, inquiries into procedural unconscionability often focus on 
whether the contract contained “fine print” or whether the seller used “high-
pressured” tactics in making the sale.130  Whether the party challenging arbitration 
was “surprised” to find the clause compelling arbitration in the agreement is also a 
factor courts take into consideration.131  In some states, the procedural prong of the 
unconscionability defense is satisfied upon a finding of a contract of adhesion.132  
Other states apply a much heavier burden on consumers.  For example, a court 
applying Michigan law stated that, “[a] contract is an adhesion contract only if the 
party agrees to the contract because he has no meaningful choice to obtain the 
desired goods or services elsewhere.”133  A court applying Tennessee law stated that, 
“[a] contract is not adhesive merely because it is a standardized form offered on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis.”134  Other courts find that when the arbitration clause is in a 
boilerplate agreement to which the consumer has no power to negotiate the terms, a 
careful review of the arbitration agreement is required.135   
The type of consumer transaction at issue may also influence the approach of a 
particular court.  The Ohio Supreme Court finds that arbitration forms in consumer 
credit agreements “engender more reservations” than similar agreements in 
brokerage account agreements or commercial bargaining agreements.136  Thus, while 
the nature of the employer/employee relationship is central to the determination of 
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in the employment context, the nature 
of the consumer transaction itself may be central to a particular court’s analysis in 
                                                                
129 Id. at 364 (finding the arbitration clause unenforceable on procedural unconscionability 
alone). 
130 See generally David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: 
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. 
REV. 33 (1997). 
131 See, e.g., Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (W.D. Mich. 
2000) (finding procedural unconscionability in a typical automotive sales practice where 
dealers rush customers through the paper work process, often failing to provide copies of 
paperwork at the time of signing). 
132 See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying California law 
when holding that “A contract is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion, 
i.e., a standardized contract, drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, that relegates 
to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.”); Flores, 
113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382 (applying California law when stating that “the arbitration agreement 
. . . imposed upon plaintiffs on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis . . . was a contract of adhesion and 
thereby procedurally unconscionable”); McNulty, 843 A.2d at 1273 (holding that the 
procedural unconscionability prong is met when “[t]he contract in question is a classic 
example of an adhesion contract”). 
133 See, e.g., Veal v. Orkin Exterminating Co., No. 1:00-CV-920, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4846, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2001). 
134 Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 2004). 
135 See, e.g., Williams, 700 N.E.2d 859. 
136 Id. at 866. 
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the consumer area.137  One area, however, in which courts have not been very 
receptive to the defense, is in the “form in a box” sales of computers by Gateway.138  
The use of arbitration clauses in direct sales of computers has been the subject of 
considerable litigation.  After the customer orders the product over the phone, the 
computer eventually arrives in a box along with a copy of Gateway’s “Standard 
Terms and Conditions,” which include a pre-dispute arbitration clause that governs 
unless the customer returns the computer in 30 days.  This clause was enforced by 
the Seventh Circuit in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.139 
The inquiry into substantive unconscionability or the “evils in the resulting 
contract” takes a variety of forms.  Substantial precedent is developing from 
consumer as well as employment cases involving unconscionability on grounds of 
prohibitive arbitration fees.140  Although the United States Supreme Court in Green 
Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph held that the mere risk of excessive arbitration fees 
is insufficient grounds for unenforceability,141 a growing number of courts have 
considered high arbitration fees as a factor in the unconscionability analysis.  While 
the size of the fee is relevant to the determination, whether the cost’s assessed are 
beyond the consumer’s expectations is also a factor.142  Courts also consider whether 
the fees conflict with the purpose of the statute before the court143 and the public 
interest affected by the fee provision.144 
                                                                
137 Eagle, 809 N.E.2d at 1175 (noting the importance of “giving special attention to 
consumer transactions involving such expensive products as automobiles, which are of critical 
importance to the consumer-buyer” when finding an arbitration clause in a contract involving 
the purchase of an automobile unconscionable). 
138 See, e.g., Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.  
139 Id. (“By keeping the computer beyond 30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway’s offer, 
including the arbitration clause.”).  But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. 
Kan. 2000) (denying Gateway’s motion to dismiss consumer’s breach of warranty suit 
reasoning that Gateway has accepted the offer “either by completing the sales transaction in 
person or by agreeing to ship and/or shipping the computer to plaintiff,” the court found 
Gateway’s “additional” arbitration term could only become part of the bargain if plaintiff had 
“expressly” agreed to the additional term per U.C.C. § 2-207). 
140 See, e.g., Pinedo v. Premium Tobacco Stores, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000) (finding arbitration clause unconscionable when employee required to pay all fees in the 
arbitration); Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574 (rejecting procedural unconscionability claim, but 
holding that excessive filing fee of $4000, only $2000 of which would be refunded if 
consumer prevailed, and location for arbitration rendered clause substantively unconscionable 
and unenforceable); Teleserve Sys., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 659 N.Y.S.2d 659 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1997) (illustrating that, in a commercial case, a filing fee of $4000 plus one-half of 
one percent of the amount claimed is unconscionable). 
141 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 531 U.S. at 91; see also Wilkins v. Weber Motors 
Fresno, Inc., No. F045545, 2005 WL 1941273, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2005) (severing 
cost provision from arbitration agreement on grounds of unconscionability). 
142 See Myers v. Terminix Int’l Co., 697 N.E.2d 277 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1998) (holding 
unconscionable requirement that homeowner pay nonrefundable arbitration fee, which could 
range from $750 to $2000, when undisclosed in original arbitration agreement). 
143 See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(striking cost-splitting provision from employer’s arbitration clause under Ohio law because it 
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss3/3
2006] UNCONSCIONABILITY FOUND 269 
Many courts find “one-way” or “non-mutual” arbitration clauses substantively 
unconscionable.145  In Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., the court applying West 
Virginia law described the “one-way” clause as the sort of deal that might be reached 
by a rabbit and a fox.146  In Arnold, the clause before the court required the consumer 
to submit any claims they may have against the lender to arbitration, but permitted 
the lender to go to court to collect any debts owed.147  The court concluded that the 
agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable.148 
As part of the overall unconscionability analysis courts cite a variety of other 
factors that may alone or in part constitute substantive unconscionability.  For 
example, bias in the arbitration mechanism or arbitrator;149 limitations in 
discovery;150 waiver of remedies;151 inconvenient arbitration forum,152 fraud,153 and 
the general contract defense of lack of mutuality.154 
                                                           
interfered with purpose of Title VII); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 
1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring employee to pay potentially thousands of dollars to 
participate in arbitration forum renders forum impractical for vindication of statutory rights). 
144 See Delta Funding Corp., 2006 WL 2277984, at *4-7 (holding that an arbitration 
agreement ambiguously giving unfettered discretion to shift the entire cost of arbitration may 
have a “chilling effect” and would violate the right to recover discretionary attorney’s fees and 
costs under consumer statutory law). 
145 See, e.g., Adams, 279 F.3d at 893-94; Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 
854 (W. Va. 1998).  
146 See Arnold, 511 S.E.2d at 861.  But see Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that fact lender may litigate while borrower must arbitrate does not, 
standing alone, render the arbitration clause unconscionable). 
147 Arnold, 511 S.E.2d at 858. 
148 Id. at 862. 
149 See, e.g., Alexander, 341 F.3d 256 (holding that a 30-day time limit for filing an 
arbitration claim was substantively unconscionable); Hooters, 173 F.3d at 940 (showing that 
procedural overreaching was held to create a “sham unworthy even of the name arbitration”); 
Graham, 623 P.2d at 177. 
150 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 683. 
151 See, e.g., Wining, 2006 WL 2766007, at *5 (holding under California law that class 
action/arbitration waivers are unconscionable); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, L.L.C., 828 
N.E.2d 812 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (applying Illinois law struck down a provision waiving class 
actions hidden in the middle of a long technical paragraph); Muhammad v. Rehoboth Beach, 
No. A-39 September Term 2005, 2006 WL 2273448 (N.J. Aug. 9, 2006) (finding that a class 
action arbitration bar acts as a waiver of remedies effectively preventing a borrower from 
pursuing consumer protection rights under New Jersey law); Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (applying 
West Virginia law the court held that language in retailer’s purchase and financing agreement 
that prohibited punitive damages and class action relief was unconscionable and 
unenforceable); see also Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to 
Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 
S.P.G. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 78 n.13 (2004) (cataloging the “numerous courts” 
holding “that the inclusion of a class action prohibition in an arbitration clause may render that 
clause unconscionable”).  Applying Alabama law one court held that 
[a] predispute arbitration clause that forbids an arbitrator from awarding punitive 
damages is void as contrary to the public policy of this State -- to protect its citizens in 
certain legislatively prescribed actions from wrongful behavior and to punish the 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s utilization of the FAA over the past few decades as the 
vehicle for overcoming hostility toward the arbitration process may have generated 
the back lash taking place in state courts today.  The aggressively drafted arbitration 
clauses employees and consumers encounter daily are part of the “stampede”155 by 
employers and others to fashion pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements taking 
full advantage of the pro-arbitration philosophy articulated by the federal judiciary.  
In the ten years since the Supreme Court eviscerated state regulatory power to police 
arbitration clauses per se in Casarotto156 a new body of arbitration jurisprudence law 
has developed around one of the few options left for denying enforceability of these 
                                                           
wrongdoer.  If parties to an arbitration agreement waive an arbitrator’s ability to award 
punitive damages, the door will open wide to rampant fraudulent conduct with few, if 
any, legal repercussion. 
Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson, 823 So. 2d 1237, 1248 (Ala. 2001); see also Ex parte Thicklin, 
824 So. 2d 723 (Ala. 2002) (holding arbitration clause in mobile dealer’s contract 
unconscionable to the extent it negated possibility of punitive damages and was severed from 
agreement); Bellsouth Mobility v. Christopher, 819 So. 2d 171 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (holding 
that defendant’s arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable because class action suit 
and punitive damages were prohibited); Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 977 P.2d 989 (Mont. 1999) 
(holding, in an opinion carefully worded to avoid the pitfalls of Casarotto, that a telephone 
directory publisher’s contract with a customer was a contract of adhesion and substantively 
unconscionable in that it was one-sided in favor of the drafter and that remedies were unduly 
limited). 
152 See Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that 
“[i]n sum, the agreement to arbitrate is not unconscionable, but requiring arbitration in 
Arkansas is”); Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a 
contract requiring a California franchise to arbitrate in Utah was unconscionable under 
California law); Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 866 (invalidating an arbitration agreement in 
connection with a consumer loan due to its inconvenient forum and other unconscionable 
provisions).  But see Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 980 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(rejecting an unconscionability argument involving a clause requiring arbitration outside of the 
state where the franchise is located). 
153 See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (holding 
an arbitration clause misleading as to speed and other aspects). 
154 See, e.g., Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361 (Ark. 
2000) (refusing to enforce an arbitration provision in a “payday loan” contract that required 
the borrower to submit her claims to arbitration while allowing the lender to pursue a 
collection action in court); Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 
2000) (applying state contract principles of “illusory” promises to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement requiring an employee to arbitrate his claims before a private arbitration company 
that specifically reserved the right to modify all rules and procedures without notice or consent 
to the employee); Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689-99 (holding that it is unconscionable to permit an 
employer to select litigation or arbitration of disputes while the employee’s only option was 
arbitration); Samek v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 793 N.E.2d 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding 
that a one-way arbitration clause permitting the insurer to seek a trial de novo, given an award 
in excess of $20,000, was unconscionable and in violation of public policy). 
155 Howard, supra note 44, at 255. 
156 Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681. 
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agreements, the contractual defense of unconscionability.  The unconscionability 
doctrine, like the common law itself, is flexible, empowering, and well suited for 
policing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contracts for overall fairness.  Over the 
past decade, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Casarotto the judiciary is “not 
timid about applying state law” and this state law defense.157  Whether courts are 
inappropriately stretching the unconscionability defense,158 I leave for further study. 
                                                                
157 POUND, supra note 62, at 123 (“Judges were not timid about applying state law, and not 
simply deferring to the U.S. Supreme Court or the FAA.”) 
158 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 265. 
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